NANO SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CENTRE
PVT.LTD., AMEERPET, HYD
DOT NET
PROJECTS LIST--2013
DOT NET 2013 IEEE PAPERS
Thwarting
Control-Channel Jamming
Attacks from Inside Jammers
ABSTRACT:
Coordination of network
functions in wireless networks requires frequent exchange of control messages
among participating nodes. Typically, such messages are transmitted over a universally
known communication channel referred to as the control channel. Due to its
critical role, this channel can become a prime target of Denial-of-Service (DOS)
attacks. In this paper, we address the problem of preventing control-channel DOS
attacks manifested in the form of jamming. We consider a sophisticated adversary
who has knowledge of the protocol specifics and of the cryptographic quantities
used to secure network operations. This type of adversary cannot be prevented
by anti jamming techniques that rely on shared secrets, such as spread
spectrum. We propose new security metrics to quantify the ability of the
adversary to deny access to the control channel, and introduce a randomized distributed
scheme that allows nodes to establish and maintain the control channel in the
presence of the jammer. Our method is
applicable
to networks with static or dynamically allocated spectrum. Furthermore, we
propose two algorithms for unique identification of the set of compromised
nodes, one for independently acting nodes and one for colluding nodes. Detailed
theoretical evaluation of the security metrics and extensive simulation results
are provided to demonstrate the efficiency of our methods in mitigating jamming
and identifying compromised nodes.
EXISTING SYSTEM:
A collection of nodes into a
wireless network requires cooperative implementation of critical network functions
such as neighbor discovery, channel access and assignment, routing, and time
synchronization. These functions are coordinated by exchanging messages on a broadcast
channel, known as the control channel. In most network architectures, including
mobile ad hoc, vehicular, sensor, cellular, mesh, and cognitive radio networks
(CRNs), the location1 of the control channel, determined by its frequency band,
time slot, or spreading code, is known a priori to all nodes participating in
the network, From a security standpoint, operating over a globally known
control channel constitutes a single point of failure. Networks deployed in
hostile environments are susceptible to Denial-of-Service (DOS) attacks by
adversaries targeting
the
functionality of the control channel . If the adversary is successful, network
service can be denied even if other available frequency bands remain
operational. One of the most effective ways for denying access to the control channel
is by jamming it. In this attack, the adversary
interferes
with the frequency band(s) used for control by transmitting a continuous
jamming signal , or several short jamming pulses. Typically, jamming attacks
have been analyzed and
addressed
as a physical-layer vulnerability. Conventional anti jamming techniques rely
extensively on spread spectrum. These techniques provide bit-level protection by
spreading bits according to a secret PN code, known only to the communicating
parties. An adversary unaware
of
this code has to transmit with a power which is several orders of magnitude
higher compared to the SS transmission, in
order to corrupt a SS signal. However, in packet radio networks, corrupting a
few more bits than the correction capability of the error correcting code (ECC)
(about
13 percent of the packet length for WLANs) is sufficient to force the dropping
of a data packet. Hence, the adversary need only stay active for a fraction of
the time required for a packet transmission. Moreover, targeting the control
channel, which typically operates at a low transmission rate, significantly
reduces the adversary’s effort. In fact, it was shown that the power required
to perform a DOS attack in GSM networks is reduced by several orders of magnitude
when the attack targets the control channel ,Moreover, potential disclosure of
cryptographic secrets (e.g., PN codes) by compromised nodes further reduces the
adversary’s effort. Note that because control information is broadcasted, PN
codes must be shared by all intended receivers. The compromise of a single
receiver leaves the network vulnerable to low-effort jamming attacks.
PROPOSED SYSTEM:
We consider a sophisticated
adversary who exploits knowledge of protocol specifications
along
with cryptographic secrets to efficiently jam the control channel. This channel
can be used by any layer in the protocol stack to broadcast control traffic,
which could include coordination information needed for protocol operation in
upper layers. To quantify the adversary’s ability to deny access to the control
channel, new security metrics are defined. A randomized distributed channel establishment
and maintenance scheme is developed to allow nodes to establish a new control
channel using frequency hopping. Under our scheme, network nodes are able to
temporarily access a control channel until the jammer is removed from the
network. Our method differs from classic frequency hopping in that no two nodes
share the same hopping sequence. This allows for unique identification of
compromised nodes by nearby ones. Our scheme is suitable for networks with
static or dynamic spectrum assignment (e.g., CRNs). For the latter, we
propose
a modification of the original scheme to take into account the dynamic nature
of channel availability in time and space. Assuming perfect random number
generators, we analytically evaluate the proposed anti jamming metrics. We
verify our analytic results via extensive simulations. Both static spectrum and
dynamic spectrum networks are considered and simulated.
HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS
Operating
System: Windows XP (Service Pack 3)
Processor:
Pentium iV
RAM:
1GB
Working
Background: Visual Studio 2010
Language:
C#
MODULES
·
Server Module
·
Client
Module
·
Jammer Removal Module
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