Privacy-Preserving Enforcement of Spatially Aware RBAC

NANO SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH CENTRE PVT.LTD.,  AMEERPET, HYD

WWW.NSRCNANO.COM, 09640648777, 09652926926

DOT NET PROJECTS LIST--2013

DOT NET 2013 IEEE PAPERS

Privacy-Preserving Enforcement

of Spatially Aware RBAC

ABSRACT:

            Several models for incorporating spatial constraints into role-based access control (RBAC) have been proposed, and researchers are now focusing on the challenge of ensuring such policies are enforced correctly. However, existing approaches have a major shortcoming, as they assume the server is trustworthy and require complete disclosure of sensitive location information by the user. In this work, we propose a novel framework and a set of protocols to solve this problem. Specifically, in our scheme, a user provides a service provider with role and location tokens along with a request. The service provider consults with a role authority and a location authority to verify the tokens and evaluate the policy. However, none of the servers learn the requesting user’s identity, role, or location. In this paper, we define the protocols and the policy enforcement scheme, and present a formal proof of a number of security properties.

EXISTING SYSTEM:

            In the Existing system the server has to check for everything about user and his behavior this makes server busy. While the challenge of creating enforcement architectures has received some focus, existing solutions require disclosure of the requesting user’s logical location or physical coordinates. Previous work has acknowledged the severe privacy threats that may occur as a result of disclosing fine-grained location information with high frequency. This problem becomes even more serious in a decentralized, loosely coupled environment, such as cloud computing, where services (e.g., data storage) are outsourced to an external provider. Thus, it is no longer the case that all components involved in the authorization process can be fully trusted to protect the privacy of the principals. Even though authorization and auditing mechanisms may prevent unauthorized disclosure of sensitive records and reduce the impact of a leak, similar protection mechanisms for the privacy of the requesting principals’ locations do not exist. Even when a centralized authorization infrastructure exists and all GEO-RBAC components reside within the administrative control of a single organization, it is possible for a rogue administrator to collect and use principals’ locations for malicious purposes (e.g., stalking, blackmail). Furthermore, the presence of malware at the service provider (SP) can also be a threat to users. 

PROPOSED SYSTEM:

            (RBAC) has become the industry standard for authorization, and it is widely deployed as it provides organizations with a simplified mechanism for granting privileged access to sensitive

resources. Although RBAC systems traditionally consider only identity attributes, such as job title, the emergence of location-based applications has led to the enrichment of the model with spatial features. A number of RBAC extensions incorporate location constraints into access control policies, providing organizations with the ability to control resource access based on the physical coordinates ofthe requesting users.

Geo-spatial RBAC (GEO-RBAC) has a large number of applications, in both military and civilian applications. Consider a military application, where physical presence in a secured room is required for a principal to access a confidential document. Such a protection model can prevent personnel from unintentionally exposing secrets in an environment where principals without the appropriate clearance are present. Alternatively, a policy may state that strictly confidential documents must only be accessed in a room that has been checked thoroughly to ensure there are no unauthorized surveillance devices present. GEO-RBAC addresses these needs and supports permission manipulation at a fine granularity. In this work, we propose a framework for privacy preserving GEO-RBAC (Privacy) that enforces location-based authorization without revealing the identity attributes or physical coordinates of requesting users to the policy enforcement point (PEP). Our approach uses a combination of cryptographic techniques and separation of functionality. The trust assumption in our model is reduced to one component, which generates all cryptographic secrets required for evaluation but does not participate in the online operations of the PEP; therefore, this component can be effectively shielded from attacks. The protocols we define ensure that the other components that participate in the online enforcement cannot learn the user’s identity, role, or location, even under very powerful adversarial assumptions. Our work reconciles competing goals of security and privacy by supporting fine-grained spatially aware RBAC while simultaneously preserving the privacy of requesting users. There are clear parallels between our work and access control mechanisms built on attribute-based encryption, That is, location and role are used as attributes for policy evaluation.

 However, existing attribute-based schemes are built on the premise that attributes (e.g., a driver’s license number or date of birth) are fairly persistent for a user, and the user simply needs a credential that certifies that the user possesses the respective attributes. In GEO-RBAC, roles and locations are inherently transient. While one user may activate a role for a short time, he will eventually be replaced by another user; additionally, users are assumed to be mobile. Given the high frequency of attribute changes, temporary credentials that are dynamically and automatically generated are mandatory for usability. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to address the challenge of attribute-based access control with transient credentials. Based on the results of this work, we believe that future work in this direction would be valuable.

The encoded roles, locations, and policies are then delivered to the Role Authority (RA), Location Authority (LA), and Service Provider, respectively. The SP stores the protected objects and ultimately makes the decision of whether to grant access or not. Based on the encoded values, the RA, LA, and SP are not able to link real roles or locations with the access request. the user initiates a role session with the RA, acquiring a role token, then presents the role token to a Location Device (LD), acquiring a location token that is bound to the role token . The user then sends the credentials (which do not reveal the role and location) to the SP, who subsequently performs an oblivious transfer (OT) and a private information retrieval (PIR) protocol with the RA and LA, respectively, thus retrieving data to evaluate the access control policy. The private retrieval steps are necessary in order to protect the access pattern of the principals: the RA and the LA do not learn anything about the encrypted credentials that are being used in the current access. The SP evaluates the access condition , and if the condition is satisfied, it grants access to the user.

HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS

Processor: Pentium IV

RAM: 1GB

Operating System: Windows XP (ServicePack3)

Working Environment: Microsoft Visual Studio 2010

Framework: DOTNET Framework 4.0

Language: visual C#

Back End: Microsoft SQL SERVER 2005

MODULES

·         Role Authority

·         Location Authority

·         Service Provider

·         User